Наясно съм с епистемологията на публикацията, както с импакт фактора и h-
индекса на автора, за това предлагам на Ивайло да наблегне на текста - има
върху какво да мисли.

Defeat

By Dr. Michael Brenner

The United States is being defeated in Ukraine. One could say that it is
facing defeat – or, more starkly, that it is staring defeat in the face.
Neither formulation is appropriate, though. The U.S. doesn’t look reality
squarely in the eye. We prefer to look at the world through the distorted
lenses of our fantasies. We plunge forward on whatever path we’ve chosen
while averting our eyes from the topography that we are trying to
traverse. Our sole guiding light is the glow of a distant mirage. That is
our lodestone.

It is not that America is a stranger to defeat. We are very well
acquainted with it: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria – in strategic terms
if not always military terms. To this broad category, we might add
Venezuela, Cuba, and Niger. That rich experience in frustrated ambition
has failed to liberate us from the deeply rooted habit of eliding defeat.
Indeed, we have acquired a large inventory of methods for doing so.

…

Before examining them, let us specify what we mean by ‘defeat.’ Simply
put, defeat is a failure to meet objectives – at tolerable cost. The term
also encompasses unintended, adverse second-order consequences.

First, hat were Washington’s objectives in sabotaging the Minsk peace plan
and cold-shouldering subsequent Russian proposals, in provoking Russia by
crossing clearly demarcated red lines, in pressing for Ukraine’s
membership in NATO; in installing missile batteries in Poland and Rumania;
in transforming the Ukrainian army into a potent military force deployed
on the line-of-contact in the Donbas ready to invade or goad Moscow into
preemptive action? The aim was to either pin a humiliating defeat on the
Russian army or, at least, to inflict such heavy costs as to cut the
ground from under the Putin government. The crucial, complementary
dimension of the strategy was the imposition of economic sanctions so
onerous as to implode a vulnerable Russian economy. Together, they would
generate acute distress leading to the deposing of Putin – whether by a
cabal of opponents (disgruntled oligarchs as the spearhead) or by mass
protest. It was predicated on the fatally ill-informed supposition that he
was an absolute dictator running a one-man show, The U.S. foresaw his
replacement by a more pliable government ready to become a willing but
marginal presence on the European stage and a non-player elsewhere. In the
crude words of one Moscow official, “a tenant-farmer on Uncle Sam’s global
plantation.”

…

Third, ancillary benefits for the United States from a war over Ukraine
that would bring Russia low were a) to consolidate the Atlantic alliance
under Washington’s control, expand NATO and open an unbridgeable abyss
between Russia and the rest of Europe that would endure for the
foreseeable future; b) to that end, the termination of the latter’s heavy
reliance on energy resources from Russia; and c) thereby, substituting
higher-priced LNG and petroleum from the United States that would seal the
European partners’ status as dependent economic vassals. If the last were
a drag on their industry, so be it.

The grandiose goals stated in (1) and (2) manifestly have proven
unreachable -indeed, fanciful – a blunt truth not as yet absorbed by
American elites. Those in (3) are consolation prizes of diminished value.
This outcome was determined in good part, albeit not at all entirely, by
the military failure in Ukraine. We now are about to enter the final act.
Kiev’s vaunted counter-offense has gone nowhere – at an enormous cost to
the Ukrainian military. It has been bled white by massive losses of
manpower, by the destruction of the greater part of its armor, by the ruin
of vital infrastructure. The Western-trained elite brigades have been
mauled, and there no longer are any reserves to throw into the battle.
Moreover, the flow of weapons and ammunition from the West has slowed as
American and European stocks are running low (e.g. 155mm artillery
shells). The shortage is being aggravated by newfound inhibitions about
sending Ukraine advanced weapons which have proven highly vulnerable to
Russian firepower. That holds especially for armor: German Leopards,
British Challengers, French AMX-10-RC tanks as well as Combat Fighting
Vehicles (CFV) like the American Bradleys and Strykers. Graphic images of
burnt-out hulks littering the Ukrainian steppe are not advertisements for
either Western military technology or foreign sales. Hence, too, the slow-
walking of deliveries to Kiev of the promised Abrams and F-16s lest they
suffer the same fate.

The illusion of eventual success on the battlefield (with its envisaged
wearing down of Russia’s will and capacity) is founded on a mistaken idea
of how to measure winning and losing. American leaders, military as well
as civilian, are stuck to a model that emphasizes control of territory.
Russian military thinking is different. Its emphasis is on the destruction
of the enemy’s forces, by whatever strategy is suited to the prevailing
conditions. Then, in command of the battlefield, they can work their will.
The aggressive tactics of the Ukrainians entails the throwing of its
resources into combat in relentless campaigns to evict the Russians from
the Donbas and Crimea. Unable to achieve any breakthrough, they invited
themselves to a war of attrition much to their disadvantage. It has been
succeeded by this summer’s all-out last fling which has proven suicidal.
They thereby played into the Russians’ hands. Hence, while attention is
fixed on who occupies this village or that on the Zaporizhhia front or
around Bakhmut, the real story is that Russia has been dismantling the
reconstituted Ukrainian army piece by piece.

…

In historical perspective, there are two instructive analogies. In the
last year of WW I, the German high command launched an audacious campaign
(Operation Michael) on the Western Front in March 1918 using a number of
innovative tactics (featuring commando squads, stormtroopers, equipped
with flame-throwers) to punch holes in allied lines. After initial gains
that brought them across the Marne, attended by very heavy casualties, the
offensive petered out and allowed the allies to roll over their gravely
depleted forces – leading to the final collapse in November. More
pertinent is the battle of Kursk in July 1943 wherein the Nazis made a
massive attempt to regain the initiative after the disaster at
Stalingrad. Again, after some noteworthy success in breaching two Soviet
defense lines they exhausted themselves short of their objective. That
battle opened the long, bloody road to Berlin. Ukraine, today, has
suffered huge losses of even greater (proportional) magnitude, without
achieving any significant territorial gains, unable even to reach the
first layer of the Surovikin Line. That will clear the road to the Dnieper
and beyond for the 600,000 strong Russian army equipped with weaponry the
equal of what we have given Ukraine. Hence, Moscow is poised to exploit
its decisive advantage to the point where it can dictate terms to Kiev,
Washington, Brussels et al.

…

There is a new narrative that is scripted to stress these talking points:

о It is Russia that has lost the contest because heroic Ukraine and a
steadfast West have prevented it from conquering, occupying and
reincorporating all of the country

о By contrast, Sweden and Finland formally have joined the American
camp by entering NATO. That complicates Moscow’s strategic plans by
forcing a dispersion of its forces across a wider front

о Russia has been politically isolated on the world scene (MB: that is
because North America, EU/NATO EUROPE, Japan, South Korea, Australia & New
Zealand have backed the Ukrainian cause. Not a single other country has
agreed to apply economic sanctions; the “world” does not include China,
India, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa et al).

о The Western democracies have displayed unprecedented solidarity in
responding as one to the Russian threat

This narrative already has been given an airing in speeches by Blinken,
Sullivan. Austin and Nuland. Its target audience is the American public;
nobody outside the Collective West buys it, though – whether Washington
has registered that fact of diplomatic life or not.

…

Americans have become masters in the art of memory management.

Think about the tragic shock of Vietnam. The country made a systematic
effort to forget – to forget everything about Vietnam. Understandably; it
was ugly – on every count. Textbooks in American history gave it little
space; teachers downplayed it; television soon disregarded it as retro. We
sought closure – we got it.

In a sense, the most noteworthy inheritance from the post-Vietnam
experience is the honing of methods to photoshop history. Vietnam was a
warm-up for dealing with the many unsavory episodes in the post-9/11 era.
That thorough, comprehensive cleansing has made palatable Presidential
mendacity, sustained deceit, mind-numbing incompetence, systemic torture,
censorship, the shredding of the Bill of Rights and the perverting of
national public discourse – as it degenerated into a mix of propaganda
and vulgar trash-talking. The “War on Terror” in all its atrocious aspects

On Wednesday, October 18, 2023 at 3:53:18 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:
> Наясно съм с епистемологията на публикацията, както с импакт фактора и h-
> индекса на автора, за това предлагам на Ивайло да наблегне на текста - има
> върху какво да мисли.

САЩ е свободна страна и всеки има право на лично мнение, но според проф. Бренър
до седмици ВСУ ще се разпадне и през зимата Русия ще стигне до Днепър (предполагам
иска да каже, че ще вземат всички територии на изток от Днепър), та моя въпрос
към теб е колко би заложил, че това ще се случи? Защото аз бих заложил много, че няма да
се случи.

>
> Defeat
>
> By Dr. Michael Brenner
>
> The United States is being defeated in Ukraine. One could say that it is
> facing defeat – or, more starkly, that it is staring defeat in the face.
> Neither formulation is appropriate, though. The U.S. doesn’t look reality
> squarely in the eye. We prefer to look at the world through the distorted
> lenses of our fantasies. We plunge forward on whatever path we’ve chosen
> while averting our eyes from the topography that we are trying to
> traverse. Our sole guiding light is the glow of a distant mirage. That is
> our lodestone.
>
> It is not that America is a stranger to defeat. We are very well
> acquainted with it: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria – in strategic terms
> if not always military terms. To this broad category, we might add
> Venezuela, Cuba, and Niger. That rich experience in frustrated ambition
> has failed to liberate us from the deeply rooted habit of eliding defeat.
> Indeed, we have acquired a large inventory of methods for doing so.
>
> …
>
> Before examining them, let us specify what we mean by ‘defeat.’ Simply
> put, defeat is a failure to meet objectives – at tolerable cost. The term
> also encompasses unintended, adverse second-order consequences.
>
> First, hat were Washington’s objectives in sabotaging the Minsk peace plan
> and cold-shouldering subsequent Russian proposals, in provoking Russia by
> crossing clearly demarcated red lines, in pressing for Ukraine’s
> membership in NATO; in installing missile batteries in Poland and Rumania;
> in transforming the Ukrainian army into a potent military force deployed
> on the line-of-contact in the Donbas ready to invade or goad Moscow into
> preemptive action? The aim was to either pin a humiliating defeat on the
> Russian army or, at least, to inflict such heavy costs as to cut the
> ground from under the Putin government. The crucial, complementary
> dimension of the strategy was the imposition of economic sanctions so
> onerous as to implode a vulnerable Russian economy. Together, they would
> generate acute distress leading to the deposing of Putin – whether by a
> cabal of opponents (disgruntled oligarchs as the spearhead) or by mass
> protest. It was predicated on the fatally ill-informed supposition that he
> was an absolute dictator running a one-man show, The U.S. foresaw his
> replacement by a more pliable government ready to become a willing but
> marginal presence on the European stage and a non-player elsewhere. In the
> crude words of one Moscow official, “a tenant-farmer on Uncle Sam’s global
> plantation.”
>
> …
>
> Third, ancillary benefits for the United States from a war over Ukraine
> that would bring Russia low were a) to consolidate the Atlantic alliance
> under Washington’s control, expand NATO and open an unbridgeable abyss
> between Russia and the rest of Europe that would endure for the
> foreseeable future; b) to that end, the termination of the latter’s heavy
> reliance on energy resources from Russia; and c) thereby, substituting
> higher-priced LNG and petroleum from the United States that would seal the
> European partners’ status as dependent economic vassals. If the last were
> a drag on their industry, so be it.
>
> The grandiose goals stated in (1) and (2) manifestly have proven
> unreachable -indeed, fanciful – a blunt truth not as yet absorbed by
> American elites. Those in (3) are consolation prizes of diminished value.
> This outcome was determined in good part, albeit not at all entirely, by
> the military failure in Ukraine. We now are about to enter the final act.
> Kiev’s vaunted counter-offense has gone nowhere – at an enormous cost to
> the Ukrainian military. It has been bled white by massive losses of
> manpower, by the destruction of the greater part of its armor, by the ruin
> of vital infrastructure. The Western-trained elite brigades have been
> mauled, and there no longer are any reserves to throw into the battle.
> Moreover, the flow of weapons and ammunition from the West has slowed as
> American and European stocks are running low (e.g. 155mm artillery
> shells). The shortage is being aggravated by newfound inhibitions about
> sending Ukraine advanced weapons which have proven highly vulnerable to
> Russian firepower. That holds especially for armor: German Leopards,
> British Challengers, French AMX-10-RC tanks as well as Combat Fighting
> Vehicles (CFV) like the American Bradleys and Strykers. Graphic images of
> burnt-out hulks littering the Ukrainian steppe are not advertisements for
> either Western military technology or foreign sales. Hence, too, the slow-
> walking of deliveries to Kiev of the promised Abrams and F-16s lest they
> suffer the same fate.
>
> The illusion of eventual success on the battlefield (with its envisaged
> wearing down of Russia’s will and capacity) is founded on a mistaken idea
> of how to measure winning and losing. American leaders, military as well
> as civilian, are stuck to a model that emphasizes control of territory.
> Russian military thinking is different. Its emphasis is on the destruction
> of the enemy’s forces, by whatever strategy is suited to the prevailing
> conditions. Then, in command of the battlefield, they can work their will..
> The aggressive tactics of the Ukrainians entails the throwing of its
> resources into combat in relentless campaigns to evict the Russians from
> the Donbas and Crimea. Unable to achieve any breakthrough, they invited
> themselves to a war of attrition much to their disadvantage. It has been
> succeeded by this summer’s all-out last fling which has proven suicidal.
> They thereby played into the Russians’ hands. Hence, while attention is
> fixed on who occupies this village or that on the Zaporizhhia front or
> around Bakhmut, the real story is that Russia has been dismantling the
> reconstituted Ukrainian army piece by piece.
>
> …
>
> In historical perspective, there are two instructive analogies. In the
> last year of WW I, the German high command launched an audacious campaign
> (Operation Michael) on the Western Front in March 1918 using a number of
> innovative tactics (featuring commando squads, stormtroopers, equipped
> with flame-throwers) to punch holes in allied lines. After initial gains
> that brought them across the Marne, attended by very heavy casualties, the
> offensive petered out and allowed the allies to roll over their gravely
> depleted forces – leading to the final collapse in November. More
> pertinent is the battle of Kursk in July 1943 wherein the Nazis made a
> massive attempt to regain the initiative after the disaster at
> Stalingrad. Again, after some noteworthy success in breaching two Soviet
> defense lines they exhausted themselves short of their objective. That
> battle opened the long, bloody road to Berlin. Ukraine, today, has
> suffered huge losses of even greater (proportional) magnitude, without
> achieving any significant territorial gains, unable even to reach the
> first layer of the Surovikin Line. That will clear the road to the Dnieper
> and beyond for the 600,000 strong Russian army equipped with weaponry the
> equal of what we have given Ukraine. Hence, Moscow is poised to exploit
> its decisive advantage to the point where it can dictate terms to Kiev,
> Washington, Brussels et al.
>
> …
>
> There is a new narrative that is scripted to stress these talking points:
>
> о It is Russia that has lost the contest because heroic Ukraine and a
> steadfast West have prevented it from conquering, occupying and
> reincorporating all of the country
>
> о By contrast, Sweden and Finland formally have joined the American
> camp by entering NATO. That complicates Moscow’s strategic plans by
> forcing a dispersion of its forces across a wider front
>
> о Russia has been politically isolated on the world scene (MB: that is
> because North America, EU/NATO EUROPE, Japan, South Korea, Australia & New
> Zealand have backed the Ukrainian cause. Not a single other country has
> agreed to apply economic sanctions; the “world” does not include China,
> India, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South
> Africa et al).
>
> о The Western democracies have displayed unprecedented solidarity in
> responding as one to the Russian threat
>
> This narrative already has been given an airing in speeches by Blinken,
> Sullivan. Austin and Nuland. Its target audience is the American public;
> nobody outside the Collective West buys it, though – whether Washington
> has registered that fact of diplomatic life or not.
>
> …
>
> Americans have become masters in the art of memory management.
>
> Think about the tragic shock of Vietnam. The country made a systematic
> effort to forget – to forget everything about Vietnam. Understandably; it
> was ugly – on every count. Textbooks in American history gave it little
> space; teachers downplayed it; television soon disregarded it as retro. We
> sought closure – we got it.
>
> In a sense, the most noteworthy inheritance from the post-Vietnam
> experience is the honing of methods to photoshop history. Vietnam was a
> warm-up for dealing with the many unsavory episodes in the post-9/11 era.
> That thorough, comprehensive cleansing has made palatable Presidential
> mendacity, sustained deceit, mind-numbing incompetence, systemic torture,
> censorship, the shredding of the Bill of Rights and the perverting of
> national public discourse – as it degenerated into a mix of propaganda
> and vulgar trash-talking. The “War on Terror” in all its atrocious aspects
>
> Cultivated amnesia is a craft enormously facilitated by two broader trends
> in American culture: the cult of ignorance whereby a knowledge-free mind
> is esteemed as the ultimate freedom; and a public ethic whereby the
> nation’s highest officials are given license to treat the truth as a
> potter treats clay so long as they say and do things that make us feel
> good. So, our strongest collective memory of America’s wars of choice is
> the desirability – and ease – of forgetting them. “The show must go on” is
> taken as our imperative. So it will be when we look at a ruined Ukraine in
> the rear-view mirror.
>
> …
>
> Цялата публикация -> https://neutralitystudies.com/2023/10/defeat/
>
> --
> «地 球 誕 生 在 牛 市 的 小 時 — Earth is born in the Bull's hour»

On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 5:39:55 PM UTC+3, Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 18, 2023 at 3:53:18 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:
....
> до седмици ВСУ ще се разпадне и през зимата Русия ще стигне до Днепър (предполагам
> иска да каже, че ще вземат всички територии на изток от Днепър), .....

Половината Киев е на изток от Днепър :)

On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 07:39:53 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:

> On Wednesday, October 18, 2023 at 3:53:18 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:

>> Наясно съм с епистемологията на публикацията, както с импакт фактора и
>> h- индекса на автора, за това предлагам на Ивайло да наблегне на текста
>> - има върху какво да мисли.

> САЩ е свободна страна и всеки има право на лично мнение, но според проф.
> Бренър до седмици ВСУ ще се разпадне и през зимата Русия ще стигне до
> Днепър (предполагам иска да каже, че ще вземат всички територии на изток
> от Днепър), та моя въпрос към теб е колко би заложил, че това ще се
> случи? Защото аз бих заложил много, че няма да се случи.

Ха-ха, САЩ била свободна страна, но според професор Бренър … да не цитирам
повече. Би ли споделил каква е връзката между това, че сте свободна страна
и прогнозираното (според теб) от професора?

А и защо трябва да залагам? На теб, ако ти се залага, давай, има
достатъчно букмейкъри и по вашенско.

И само това ли успя да измислиш? Само това ли те впечатли от текста?

Между другото, къде в текста професор Бренър прави подобна прогноза?

Ukraine, today, has suffered huge losses of even greater (proportional)
magnitude, without achieving any significant territorial gains, unable
even to reach the first layer of the Surovikin Line. That will clear the
road to the Dnieper and beyond for the 600,000 strong Russian army
equipped with weaponry the equal of what we have given Ukraine. Hence,
Moscow is poised to exploit its decisive advantage to the point where it
can dictate terms to Kiev, Washington, Brussels et al.

Това не е прогноза, ако за него натякваш.

Пак ли „Я Солженицин не читал, но оссуждаю!“

>> Defeat

>> By Dr. Michael Brenner

>> The United States is being defeated in Ukraine. One could say that it
>> is facing defeat – or, more starkly, that it is staring defeat in the
>> face.
>> Neither formulation is appropriate, though. The U.S. doesn’t look
>> reality squarely in the eye. We prefer to look at the world through the
>> distorted lenses of our fantasies. We plunge forward on whatever path
>> we’ve chosen while averting our eyes from the topography that we are
>> trying to traverse. Our sole guiding light is the glow of a distant
>> mirage. That is our lodestone.

>> It is not that America is a stranger to defeat. We are very well
>> acquainted with it: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria – in strategic
>> terms if not always military terms. To this broad category, we might
>> add Venezuela, Cuba, and Niger. That rich experience in frustrated
>> ambition has failed to liberate us from the deeply rooted habit of
>> eliding defeat.
>> Indeed, we have acquired a large inventory of methods for doing so.

>> …

>> Before examining them, let us specify what we mean by ‘defeat.’ Simply
>> put, defeat is a failure to meet objectives – at tolerable cost. The
>> term also encompasses unintended, adverse second-order consequences.

>> First, hat were Washington’s objectives in sabotaging the Minsk peace
>> plan and cold-shouldering subsequent Russian proposals, in provoking
>> Russia by crossing clearly demarcated red lines, in pressing for
>> Ukraine’s membership in NATO; in installing missile batteries in Poland
>> and Rumania;
>> in transforming the Ukrainian army into a potent military force
>> deployed on the line-of-contact in the Donbas ready to invade or goad
>> Moscow into preemptive action? The aim was to either pin a humiliating
>> defeat on the Russian army or, at least, to inflict such heavy costs as
>> to cut the ground from under the Putin government. The crucial,
>> complementary dimension of the strategy was the imposition of economic
>> sanctions so onerous as to implode a vulnerable Russian economy.
>> Together, they would generate acute distress leading to the deposing of
>> Putin – whether by a cabal of opponents (disgruntled oligarchs as the
>> spearhead) or by mass protest. It was predicated on the fatally
>> ill-informed supposition that he was an absolute dictator running a
>> one-man show, The U.S. foresaw his replacement by a more pliable
>> government ready to become a willing but marginal presence on the
>> European stage and a non-player elsewhere. In the crude words of one
>> Moscow official, “a tenant-farmer on Uncle Sam’s global plantation.”

>> …

>> Third, ancillary benefits for the United States from a war over Ukraine
>> that would bring Russia low were a) to consolidate the Atlantic
>> alliance under Washington’s control, expand NATO and open an
>> unbridgeable abyss between Russia and the rest of Europe that would
>> endure for the foreseeable future; b) to that end, the termination of
>> the latter’s heavy reliance on energy resources from Russia; and c)
>> thereby, substituting higher-priced LNG and petroleum from the United
>> States that would seal the European partners’ status as dependent
>> economic vassals. If the last were a drag on their industry, so be it.

>> The grandiose goals stated in (1) and (2) manifestly have proven
>> unreachable -indeed, fanciful – a blunt truth not as yet absorbed by
>> American elites. Those in (3) are consolation prizes of diminished
>> value.
>> This outcome was determined in good part, albeit not at all entirely,
>> by the military failure in Ukraine. We now are about to enter the final
>> act.
>> Kiev’s vaunted counter-offense has gone nowhere – at an enormous cost
>> to the Ukrainian military. It has been bled white by massive losses of
>> manpower, by the destruction of the greater part of its armor, by the
>> ruin of vital infrastructure. The Western-trained elite brigades have
>> been mauled, and there no longer are any reserves to throw into the
>> battle.
>> Moreover, the flow of weapons and ammunition from the West has slowed
>> as American and European stocks are running low (e.g. 155mm artillery
>> shells). The shortage is being aggravated by newfound inhibitions about
>> sending Ukraine advanced weapons which have proven highly vulnerable to
>> Russian firepower. That holds especially for armor: German Leopards,
>> British Challengers, French AMX-10-RC tanks as well as Combat Fighting
>> Vehicles (CFV) like the American Bradleys and Strykers. Graphic images
>> of burnt-out hulks littering the Ukrainian steppe are not
>> advertisements for either Western military technology or foreign sales.
>> Hence, too, the slow-
>> walking of deliveries to Kiev of the promised Abrams and F-16s lest
>> they suffer the same fate.

>> The illusion of eventual success on the battlefield (with its envisaged
>> wearing down of Russia’s will and capacity) is founded on a mistaken
>> idea of how to measure winning and losing. American leaders, military
>> as well as civilian, are stuck to a model that emphasizes control of
>> territory.
>> Russian military thinking is different. Its emphasis is on the
>> destruction of the enemy’s forces, by whatever strategy is suited to
>> the prevailing conditions. Then, in command of the battlefield, they
>> can work their will.
>> The aggressive tactics of the Ukrainians entails the throwing of its
>> resources into combat in relentless campaigns to evict the Russians
>> from the Donbas and Crimea. Unable to achieve any breakthrough, they
>> invited themselves to a war of attrition much to their disadvantage. It
>> has been succeeded by this summer’s all-out last fling which has proven
>> suicidal.
>> They thereby played into the Russians’ hands. Hence, while attention is
>> fixed on who occupies this village or that on the Zaporizhhia front or
>> around Bakhmut, the real story is that Russia has been dismantling the
>> reconstituted Ukrainian army piece by piece.

>> …

>> In historical perspective, there are two instructive analogies. In the
>> last year of WW I, the German high command launched an audacious
>> campaign (Operation Michael) on the Western Front in March 1918 using a
>> number of innovative tactics (featuring commando squads, stormtroopers,
>> equipped with flame-throwers) to punch holes in allied lines. After
>> initial gains that brought them across the Marne, attended by very
>> heavy casualties, the offensive petered out and allowed the allies to
>> roll over their gravely depleted forces – leading to the final collapse
>> in November. More pertinent is the battle of Kursk in July 1943 wherein
>> the Nazis made a massive attempt to regain the initiative after the
>> disaster at Stalingrad. Again, after some noteworthy success in
>> breaching two Soviet defense lines they exhausted themselves short of
>> their objective. That battle opened the long, bloody road to Berlin.
>> Ukraine, today, has suffered huge losses of even greater (proportional)
>> magnitude, without achieving any significant territorial gains, unable
>> even to reach the first layer of the Surovikin Line. That will clear
>> the road to the Dnieper and beyond for the 600,000 strong Russian army
>> equipped with weaponry the equal of what we have given Ukraine. Hence,
>> Moscow is poised to exploit its decisive advantage to the point where
>> it can dictate terms to Kiev,
>> Washington, Brussels et al.

On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 1:07:28 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:
> On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 07:39:53 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:
>
> > On Wednesday, October 18, 2023 at 3:53:18 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:
>
> >> Наясно съм с епистемологията на публикацията, както с импакт фактора и
> >> h- индекса на автора, за това предлагам на Ивайло да наблегне на текста
> >> - има върху какво да мисли.
>
> > САЩ е свободна страна и всеки има право на лично мнение, но според проф.
> > Бренър до седмици ВСУ ще се разпадне и през зимата Русия ще стигне до
> > Днепър (предполагам иска да каже, че ще вземат всички територии на изток
> > от Днепър), та моя въпрос към теб е колко би заложил, че това ще се
> > случи? Защото аз бих заложил много, че няма да се случи.
> Ха-ха, САЩ била свободна страна, но според професор Бренър … да не цитирам
> повече. Би ли споделил каква е връзката между това, че сте свободна страна
> и прогнозираното (според теб) от професора?

Връзката е, че професора може да изрази "дисидентско" мнение за войната без да се
страхува за живота и свободата си, както би било в Русия, но не виждам
особени причини защо трябва да се съгласим с него (когато е направил
очевидно абсурдни прогнози).

>
> А и защо трябва да залагам? На теб, ако ти се залага, давай, има
> достатъчно букмейкъри и по вашенско.

Защото, ако наистина вярваше в глупстите написани от него, не
виждам защо не би заложил на тяхната правота.

>
> И само това ли успя да измислиш? Само това ли те впечатли от текста?

Да, само това. Изразил е мнение, с което не съм съгласен, и след това
е дал прогноза базирана на мнението, която намирам за нищожно малко
вероятна. Ти какво измисли?

>
> Между другото, къде в текста професор Бренър прави подобна прогноза?

Не е съвсем ясно в текста даден от теб, но може да се чуе ясно в това интервю
дадено няколко дена след публикацията на есето:
https://youtu.be/qfxVKvKLzLo?t=81

> Ukraine, today, has suffered huge losses of even greater (proportional)
> magnitude, without achieving any significant territorial gains, unable
> even to reach the first layer of the Surovikin Line. That will clear the
> road to the Dnieper and beyond for the 600,000 strong Russian army
> equipped with weaponry the equal of what we have given Ukraine. Hence,
> Moscow is poised to exploit its decisive advantage to the point where it
> can dictate terms to Kiev, Washington, Brussels et al.
> Това не е прогноза, ако за него натякваш.
>
> Пак ли „Я Солженицин не читал, но оссуждаю!“

Не, по-добре осведомен от теб и "оссуждаю!“

On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 10:27:54 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:

> On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 1:07:28 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:

>> On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 07:39:53 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:

>> > On Wednesday, October 18, 2023 at 3:53:18 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:

>> >> Наясно съм с епистемологията на публикацията, както с импакт фактора
>> >> и h- индекса на автора, за това предлагам на Ивайло да наблегне на
>> >> текста - има върху какво да мисли.

>> > САЩ е свободна страна и всеки има право на лично мнение, но според
>> > проф. Бренър до седмици ВСУ ще се разпадне и през зимата Русия ще
>> > стигне до Днепър (предполагам иска да каже, че ще вземат всички
>> > територии на изток от Днепър), та моя въпрос към теб е колко би
>> > заложил, че това ще се случи? Защото аз бих заложил много, че няма да
>> > се случи.

>> Ха-ха, САЩ била свободна страна, но според професор Бренър … да не
>> цитирам повече. Би ли споделил каква е връзката между това, че сте
>> свободна страна и прогнозираното (според теб) от професора?

> Връзката е, че професора може да изрази "дисидентско" мнение за войната
> без да се страхува за живота и свободата си, както би било в Русия, но
> не виждам особени причини защо трябва да се съгласим с него (когато е
> направил очевидно абсурдни прогнози).

Шикалкавиш - „дисидентското“ в публикацията на професора е по отношение на
шатите, а не на Русия.

И си запомни отговора добре, защото ще ти го цитирам всеки път, когато
пуснеш някоя публикация от някой дисидент в Русия.

>> А и защо трябва да залагам? На теб, ако ти се залага, давай, има
>> достатъчно букмейкъри и по вашенско.

> Защото, ако наистина вярваше в глупостите написани от него, не виждам
> защо не би заложил на тяхната правота.

Не знам как живееш с глупостите, които пишеш. Явно не ти минава през
главата мисълта, че просто може да не съм хазартен тип.

>> И само това ли успя да измислиш? Само това ли те впечатли от текста?

> Да, само това. Изразил е мнение, с което не съм съгласен, и след това е
> дал прогноза базирана на мнението, която намирам за нищожно малко
> вероятна. Ти какво измисли?

Прогноза?! Я пак.

>> Между другото, къде в текста професор Бренър прави подобна прогноза?

> Не е съвсем ясно в текста даден от теб, но може да се чуе ясно в това
> интервю дадено няколко дена след публикацията на есето:
> https://youtu.be/qfxVKvKLzLo?t=81

Трогнат съм от представата ти за мен, че съм господ и мога да знам какво е
бил казал професорът в някакво интервю.

Разбра ли сега защо си лъжец?

>> Ukraine, today, has suffered huge losses of even greater (proportional)
>> magnitude, without achieving any significant territorial gains, unable
>> even to reach the first layer of the Surovikin Line. That will clear
>> the road to the Dnieper and beyond for the 600,000 strong Russian army
>> equipped with weaponry the equal of what we have given Ukraine. Hence,
>> Moscow is poised to exploit its decisive advantage to the point where
>> it can dictate terms to Kiev, Washington, Brussels et al.
>> Това не е прогноза, ако за него натякваш.

>> Пак ли „Я Солженицин не читал, но оссуждаю!“

> Не, по-добре осведомен от теб и "оссуждаю!“

Аха, аха, ако беше по-добре осведомен, нямаше да е „и оссуждаю“.

--
«地 球 誕 生 在 牛 市 的 小 時 — Earth is born in the Bull's hour»

On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 10:27:54 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:

> Връзката е, че професора може да изрази "дисидентско" мнение
> за войната без да се страхува за живота и свободата си

Само за работата си. Мислиш ли че е малко?

On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 08:40:25 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:

> On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 11:09:47 AM UTC-4, ИлиевBG wrote:

>> On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 5:39:55 PM UTC+3, Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:

>> > On Wednesday, October 18, 2023 at 3:53:18 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:

>> ....

>> > до седмици ВСУ ще се разпадне и през зимата Русия ще стигне до Днепър
>> > (предполагам иска да каже, че ще вземат всички територии на изток от
>> > Днепър), .....

>> Половината Киев е на изток от Днепър :)

> Ето как се запътиха към Днепър:
> https://youtu.be/fbuNBEy2ItI

> Загубите от вчера: 55 танка и 120 бронирани машини.

Ха-ха, кой глупак наскоро се оплакваше тук, че съм се бил позовавал на
някакви абсолютно неизвестни канали в youtube?

Untold News

Можеш ли да ни припомниш?

А приложи ли уменията си в епистемологията към това видео? Явно не, защото
иначе нямаше да го пуснеш.

--
«地 球 誕 生 在 牛 市 的 小 時 — Earth is born in the Bull's hour»

On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 1:50:18 PM UTC-4, chorbalan wrote:
> On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 10:27:54 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:
>
> > Връзката е, че професора може да изрази "дисидентско" мнение
> > за войната без да се страхува за живота и свободата си
> Само за работата си. Мислиш ли че е малко?

Човека ми изглежда на дълбока пенсия. Но дори да беше действащ
професор не виждам как това есе щеше да му навреди на работата.
Джефри Сакс е действащ професор. Джон Миъшаймър също. Приказваш
глупости.

On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 7:39:55 AM UTC-7, Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 18, 2023 at 3:53:18 PM UTC-4, Nick wrote:
> > Наясно съм с епистемологията на публикацията, както с импакт фактора и h-
> > индекса на автора, за това предлагам на Ивайло да наблегне на текста - има
> > върху какво да мисли.
> САЩ е свободна страна

ха ха ха ха

> и всеки има право на лично мнение,

ха ха ха ха

но според проф. Бренър
> до седмици ВСУ ще се разпадне и през зимата Русия ще стигне до Днепър (предполагам
> иска да каже, че ще вземат всички територии на изток от Днепър), та моя въпрос
> към теб е колко би заложил, че това ще се случи? Защото аз бих заложил много, че няма да
> се случи.

On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 13:06:10 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:

> On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 1:50:18 PM UTC-4, chorbalan wrote:
>> On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 10:27:54 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:
>>
>> > Връзката е, че професора може да изрази "дисидентско" мнение
>> > за войната без да се страхува за живота и свободата си
>> Само за работата си. Мислиш ли че е малко?
>
> Човека ми изглежда на дълбока пенсия. Но дори да беше действащ
> професор не виждам как това есе щеше да му навреди на работата.

Сериозно? Или си кьорав, както обикновено когато ти изнася..
> Приказваш глупости.

По-скоро ти.

On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 8:51:54 PM UTC-4, chorbalan wrote:
> On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 13:06:10 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:
>
> > On Friday, October 20, 2023 at 1:50:18 PM UTC-4, chorbalan wrote:
> >> On Fri, 20 Oct 2023 10:27:54 -0700 (PDT), Ivaylo Ivanov wrote:
> >>
> >> > Връзката е, че професора може да изрази "дисидентско" мнение
> >> > за войната без да се страхува за живота и свободата си
> >> Само за работата си. Мислиш ли че е малко?
> >
> > Човека ми изглежда на дълбока пенсия. Но дори да беше действащ
> > професор не виждам как това есе щеше да му навреди на работата.
> Сериозно? Или си кьорав, както обикновено когато ти изнася..
>

Човек на 80+ не е на дълбока пенсия?? Кой е кьоравия?