-- (DRAFT) INFORMAL RESEARCH NOTES ON A PLAUSIBLE NOEMA SCENARIO [#230 -
WICKED, #232 - KNIFE / WEAPON, #249 - SATOR (#38), #228 - ONTIC LIMIT /
WITNESSING TRAVESTY AS REPROACH, #237 - DEME LIMIT / USE OF FORCE] RELATED
TO RAMPAGE KILLING EVENTS

In our informal research as self education, the meta-descriptive
aggregation of concepts of mind most likely has some relevance to the
philosophical concept of intentionality. But what we have recognised from
our memeBrain prototypes, is that the #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY and its
dynamic problem resolution pairing only occurs by being couched with a
preamble for which we have a desire to examine if the resolution idea has
recurrence as then a criteria for its attainment as pairing action being a
function of mind.

For want of a better term, we might consider this dá dào (達到): to reach; to
achieve; to attain

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:達>

dá (達): 1. to attain; to reach, 2. Da, 3. intelligent proficient, 4. to be
open; to be connected, 5. to realize; to complete; to accomplish, 6. to
display; to manifest, 7. to tell; to inform; to say, 8. illustrious;
influential; prestigious, 9. everlasting; constant; unchanging, 10.
generous; magnanimous, 11. commonly; everywhere, 12. arbitrary; freely come
and go

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:到>

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

APPRAISAL #9: It offends the ear but sets the toe on track. (到耳順止)
The matter will go right. (事貞)
FATHOMING #9: Offended ears, compliant toes (到耳順止)
MEANS: Contrary talk makes for obedient conduct. (逆聞順行也)

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

ěrshùn (耳順): 1. an obedient *EAR*, 2. pleasing to the ear

zhǐ (止): 1. to stop; to halt, 2. until; to end, 3. Kangxi radical 77, 4.
only, 5. to prohibit; to prevent; to refrain; to suppress, 6. to remain in
one place; to stay, 7. to rest; to settle, 8. deportment; bearing;
demeanor; manner, 9. a particle at the end of a phrase, 10. foot

shì (事): 1. matter; thing; item, 2. to serve, 3. a government post, 4.
duty; post; work, 5. occupation, 6. cause; undertaking; enterprise;
achievement, 7. an accident, 8. to attend, 9. an allusion, 10. a condition;
a state; a situation, 11. to engage in, 12. to enslave, 13. to pursue, 14.
to administer, 15. to appoint, 16. a piece

zhēn (貞): 1. virtuous; chaste; pure, 2. loyal, 3. divination, 4. chastity,
5. to divine, 6. auspicious, 7. upright, 8. lower part of the trigrams in
the Yijing, 9. four

We want to explore whether achieving this goal as the #451 - PRAXIS OF
RATIONALITY and its dynamic problem resolution pairing, actually involves
the two concepts that have been central to Husserl’s internalist
interpretation of intentionality: the concept of a noema (plural noemata)
and the concept of epoche (i.e., bracketing) or phenomenological reduction.
By the word ‘noema,’ Husserl refers to the internal structure of mental
acts. The phenomenological reduction is meant to help get at the essence of
mental acts by suspending all naive presuppositions about the difference
between real and fictitious entities (on these complex phenomenological
concepts, see the papers by Føllesdal and others conveniently gathered in
Dreyfus (1982). For further discussion, see Bell (1990) and Dummett (1993).

#169 as [#50, #70, #8, #40, #1] /
#470 = #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY + #19 - FOLLOWING (TS'UNG) as [#50,
#70, #8, #40, #1, #300, #1] = nóēma (G3540): {UMBRA: #169 % #41 = #5} 1) a
mental perception, thought; 2) an evil purpose; 3) that which thinks, the
mind, thoughts or purposes

APPRAISAL #3: Men do not attack him. (人不攻之)
They are drawn to follow. (自然證)
FATHOMING #3: That men do not attack him (人不攻之)
MEANS: This, in itself, is proof of Virtue's power. (自然證也)

rén (人): 1. person; people; a human being, 2. Kangxi radical 9, 3. a kind
of person, 4. everybody, 5. adult, 6. somebody; others, 7. an upright
person

bù (不): 1. not; no, 2. expresses that a certain condition cannot be
achieved, 3. as a correlative, 4. no (answering a question), 5. forms a
negative adjective from a noun, 6. at the end of a sentence to form a
question, 7. to form a yes or no question, 8. infix potential marker

gōng (攻): 1. to attack; to assault, 2. to discredit; to impugn; to
criticize, 3. to remedy; to cure, 4. to work at; to handle, 5. workmanship;
expertise, 6. exaction by the state, 7. sturdy; strong, 8. to govern; to
administer, 9. Gong

zhī (之): 1. him; her; them; that, 2. used between a modifier and a word to
form a word group, 3. to go, 4. this; that, 5. genitive marker, 6. it, 7.
in, 8. all, 9. and, 10. however, 11. if, 12. then, 13. to arrive; to go,
14. is, 15. to use, 16. Zhi

zìrán (自然): 1. nature, 2. natural, 3. of course; certainly; naturally

zhèng (證): 1. proof, 2. to prove; to demonstrate; to confirm; to give
evidence, 3. to advise against, 4. certificate, 5. an illness, 6. to accuse

In fact, commentators have been unable to achieve consensus on exactly what
a noema is. In a recent survey, David Woodruff Smith distinguished four
different schools of thought. On one view, to say that the noema is the
intentional object of an act of consciousness is to mean that it quite
literally is an object. Husserl's student Roman Ingarden, for example, held
that both ordinary objects, like chairs and trees, and intentional objects,
like a chair precisely as it appears to me, or even a fictional tree,
actually exist, but have different "modes" of existence.

An alternative view, developed primarily by Aron Gurwitsch, emphasizes the
noema of perceptual experience. Most ordinary objects can be perceived in
different ways and from different perspectives (consider looking at a tree
from several different positions). For Gurwitsch, what is perceived in each
such act is a noema, and the object itself—the tree, say—is to be
understood as the collection or system of noemata associated with it. This
view has similarities with phenomenalism.

Robert Sokolowski, alternatively, holds that a noema is just the actual
object of perception or judgment itself, considered phenomenologically. In
other words, the noema of the judgment that "this chair is uncomfortable"
is neither an entity (the chair considered as uncomfortable) which exists
in addition to the chair itself (but with a different mode of
existence)—the Ingarden view; nor is the noema of such a judgment
identified with a particular tactile perception of the chair—which along
with other perceptions constitutes the chair as such—the Gurwitsch view.
For Sokolowski, the noema is not a separate entity at all, but the chair
itself as in this instance perceived or judged. This seems consistent with
Husserl's emphasis on the noema as the "perceived as such…remembered as
such...judged as such..."

Analytic philosopher Dagfinn Føllesdal, in an influential 1969 paper,
proposed a Fregean interpretation of the noema, which has been developed
extensively by Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith. This school of
thought agrees that the noema is not a separate entity, but rather than
identifying it with the actual object of the act (of perceiving, judging,
etc.), phenomenologically understood, this view suggests that it is a
mediating component of the act itself. It is what gives the act the sense
it has. Indeed, Føllesdal and his followers suggest that the noema is a
generalized version of Gottlob Frege's account of linguistic meaning, and
in particular of his concept of sense (Sinn). Just as Frege held that a
linguistic expression picks out its reference by means of its sense, so
Husserl believed that conscious acts generally—not merely acts of meaning
but also acts of perception, judgment, etc.—are intentionally directed
toward objects by means of their noemata. On this view, the noema is not an
object, but an abstract component of certain types of acts.

Sokolowski has continued to reject this approach, arguing that "(t)o equate
sense and noema would be to equate propositional and phenomenological
reflection. It would take philosophy simply as the critical reflection on
our meanings or senses; it would equate philosophy with linguistic
analysis." Robert C. Solomon attempted to reconcile the perception-based
interpretation of the Gurwitsch school with the Fregean interpretation of
noema as sense, suggesting that while "(i)t has now become virtually
axiomatic among phenomenologists that the Sinne [senses] of experience
stand independent of the Bedeutungen [meanings] of linguistic expressions.
It has become all but axiomatic among analytic philosophers that there is
no meaning apart from language. It is the concept of the noema that
provides the link between them. The noema embodies both the changing phases
of experience and the organizing sense of our experience. But these two
'components' are not separable, for all experience requires meaning, not as
an after-the-fact luxury in reflective judgements but in order for it to be
experience of anything." <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noema>

TETRAD MENTIONS OF [rì (日): *SUN*] @ [

ADDED LINK

-- (DRAFT) INFORMAL RESEARCH NOTES ON A PLAUSIBLE NOEMA SCENARIO [#230 -
WICKED, #232 - KNIFE / WEAPON, #249 - SATOR (#38), #228 - ONTIC LIMIT /
WITNESSING TRAVESTY AS REPROACH, #237 - DEME LIMIT / USE OF FORCE] RELATED
TO RAMPAGE KILLING EVENTS

(c) 2024 Dolf Leendert Boek, Published: 20 April 2024

In our informal research as self education, the meta-descriptive
aggregation of concepts of mind most likely has some relevance to the
philosophical concept of intentionality. But what we have recognised from
our memeBrain prototypes, is that the #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY and its
dynamic problem resolution pairing only occurs by being couched with a
preamble for which we have a desire to examine if the resolution idea has
recurrence as then a criteria for its attainment as pairing action being a
function of mind.

For want of a better term, we might consider this dá dào (達到): to reach; to
achieve; to attain

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:達>

dá (達): 1. to attain; to reach, 2. Da, 3. intelligent proficient, 4. to be
open; to be connected, 5. to realize; to complete; to accomplish, 6. to
display; to manifest, 7. to tell; to inform; to say, 8. illustrious;
influential; prestigious, 9. everlasting; constant; unchanging, 10.
generous; magnanimous, 11. commonly; everywhere, 12. arbitrary; freely come
and go

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:到>

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

APPRAISAL #9: It offends the ear but sets the toe on track. (到耳順止)
The matter will go right. (事貞)
FATHOMING #9: Offended ears, compliant toes (到耳順止)
MEANS: Contrary talk makes for obedient conduct. (逆聞順行也)

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

ěrshùn (耳順): 1. an obedient *EAR*, 2. pleasing to the ear

zhǐ (止): 1. to stop; to halt, 2. until; to end, 3. Kangxi radical 77, 4.
only, 5. to prohibit; to prevent; to refrain; to suppress, 6. to remain in
one place; to stay, 7. to rest; to settle, 8. deportment; bearing;
demeanor; manner, 9. a particle at the end of a phrase, 10. foot

shì (事): 1. matter; thing; item, 2. to serve, 3. a government post, 4.
duty; post; work, 5. occupation, 6. cause; undertaking; enterprise;
achievement, 7. an accident, 8. to attend, 9. an allusion, 10. a condition;
a state; a situation, 11. to engage in, 12. to enslave, 13. to pursue, 14.
to administer, 15. to appoint, 16. a piece

zhēn (貞): 1. virtuous; chaste; pure, 2. loyal, 3. divination, 4. chastity,
5. to divine, 6. auspicious, 7. upright, 8. lower part of the trigrams in
the Yijing, 9. four

We want to explore whether achieving this goal as the #451 - PRAXIS OF
RATIONALITY and its dynamic problem resolution pairing, actually involves
the two concepts that have been central to Husserl’s internalist
interpretation of intentionality: the concept of a noema (plural noemata)
and the concept of epoche (i.e., bracketing) or phenomenological reduction.
By the word ‘noema,’ Husserl refers to the internal structure of mental
acts. The phenomenological reduction is meant to help get at the essence of
mental acts by suspending all naive presuppositions about the difference
between real and fictitious entities (on these complex phenomenological
concepts, see the papers by Føllesdal and others conveniently gathered in
Dreyfus (1982). For further discussion, see Bell (1990) and Dummett (1993).

#169 as [#50, #70, #8, #40, #1] /
#470 = #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY + #19 - FOLLOWING (TS'UNG) as [#50,
#70, #8, #40, #1, #300, #1] = nóēma (G3540): {UMBRA: #169 % #41 = #5} 1) a
mental perception, thought; 2) an evil purpose; 3) that which thinks, the
mind, thoughts or purposes

APPRAISAL #3: Men do not attack him. (人不攻之)
They are drawn to follow. (自然證)
FATHOMING #3: That men do not attack him (人不攻之)
MEANS: This, in itself, is proof of Virtue's power. (自然證也)

rén (人): 1. person; people; a human being, 2. Kangxi radical 9, 3. a kind
of person, 4. everybody, 5. adult, 6. somebody; others, 7. an upright
person

bù (不): 1. not; no, 2. expresses that a certain condition cannot be
achieved, 3. as a correlative, 4. no (answering a question), 5. forms a
negative adjective from a noun, 6. at the end of a sentence to form a
question, 7. to form a yes or no question, 8. infix potential marker

gōng (攻): 1. to attack; to assault, 2. to discredit; to impugn; to
criticize, 3. to remedy; to cure, 4. to work at; to handle, 5. workmanship;
expertise, 6. exaction by the state, 7. sturdy; strong, 8. to govern; to
administer, 9. Gong

zhī (之): 1. him; her; them; that, 2. used between a modifier and a word to
form a word group, 3. to go, 4. this; that, 5. genitive marker, 6. it, 7.
in, 8. all, 9. and, 10. however, 11. if, 12. then, 13. to arrive; to go,
14. is, 15. to use, 16. Zhi

zìrán (自然): 1. nature, 2. natural, 3. of course; certainly; naturally

zhèng (證): 1. proof, 2. to prove; to demonstrate; to confirm; to give
evidence, 3. to advise against, 4. certificate, 5. an illness, 6. to accuse

In fact, commentators have been unable to achieve consensus on exactly what
a noema is. In a recent survey, David Woodruff Smith distinguished four
different schools of thought. On one view, to say that the noema is the
intentional object of an act of consciousness is to mean that it quite
literally is an object. Husserl's student Roman Ingarden, for example, held
that both ordinary objects, like chairs and trees, and intentional objects,
like a chair precisely as it appears to me, or even a fictional tree,
actually exist, but have different "modes" of existence.

An alternative view, developed primarily by Aron Gurwitsch, emphasizes the
noema of perceptual experience. Most ordinary objects can be perceived in
different ways and from different perspectives (consider looking at a tree
from several different positions). For Gurwitsch, what is perceived in each
such act is a noema, and the object itself—the tree, say—is to be
understood as the collection or system of noemata associated with it. This
view has similarities with phenomenalism.

Robert Sokolowski, alternatively, holds that a noema is just the actual
object of perception or judgment itself, considered phenomenologically. In
other words, the noema of the judgment that "this chair is uncomfortable"
is neither an entity (the chair considered as uncomfortable) which exists
in addition to the chair itself (but with a different mode of
existence)—the Ingarden view; nor is the noema of such a judgment
identified with a particular tactile perception of the chair—which along
with other perceptions constitutes the chair as such—the Gurwitsch view.
For Sokolowski, the noema is not a separate entity at all, but the chair
itself as in this instance perceived or judged. This seems consistent with
Husserl's emphasis on the noema as the "perceived as such…remembered as
such...judged as such..."

Analytic philosopher Dagfinn Føllesdal, in an influential 1969 paper,
proposed a Fregean interpretation of the noema, which has been developed
extensively by Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith. This school of
thought agrees that the noema is not a separate entity, but rather than
identifying it with the actual object of the act (of perceiving, judging,
etc.), phenomenologically understood, this view suggests that it is a
mediating component of the act itself. It is what gives the act the sense
it has. Indeed, Føllesdal and his followers suggest that the noema is a
generalized version of Gottlob Frege's account of linguistic meaning, and
in particular of his concept of sense (Sinn). Just as Frege held that a
linguistic expression picks out its reference by means of its sense, so
Husserl believed that conscious acts generally—not merely acts of meaning
but also acts of perception, judgment, etc.—are intentionally directed
toward objects by means of their noemata. On this view, the noema is not an
object, but an abstract component of certain types of acts.

Sokolowski has continued to reject this approach, arguing that "(t)o equate
sense and noema would be to equate propositional and phenomenological
reflection. It would take philosophy simply as the critical reflection on
our meanings or senses; it would equate philosophy with linguistic
analysis." Robert C. Solomon attempted to reconcile the perception-based
interpretation of the Gurwitsch school with the Fregean interpretation of
noema as sense, suggesting that while "(i)t has now become virtually
axiomatic among phenomenologists that the Sinne [senses] of experience
stand independent of the Bedeutungen [meanings] of linguistic expressions.
It has become all but axiomatic among analytic philosophers that there is
no meaning apart from language. It is the concept of the noema that
provides the link between them. The noema embodies both the changing phases
of experience and the organizing sense of our experience. But these two
'components' are not separable, for all experience requires meaning, not as
an after-the-fact luxury in reflective judgements but in order for it to be
experience of anything." <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noema>

-- (DRAFT) INFORMAL RESEARCH NOTES ON A PLAUSIBLE NOEMA SCENARIO [#230 -
WICKED, #232 - KNIFE / WEAPON, #249 - SATOR (#38), #228 - ONTIC LIMIT /
WITNESSING TRAVESTY AS REPROACH, #237 - DEME LIMIT / USE OF FORCE] RELATED
TO RAMPAGE KILLING EVENTS

(c) 2024 Dolf Leendert Boek, Published: 20 April 2024

In our informal research as self education, the meta-descriptive
aggregation of concepts of mind most likely has some relevance to the
philosophical concept of intentionality. But what we have recognised from
our memeBrain prototypes, is that the #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY and its
dynamic problem resolution pairing only occurs by being couched with a
preamble for which we have a desire to examine if the resolution idea has
recurrence as then a criteria for its attainment as pairing action being a
function of mind.

For want of a better term, we might consider this dá dào (達到): to reach; to
achieve; to attain

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:達>

dá (達): 1. to attain; to reach, 2. Da, 3. intelligent proficient, 4. to be
open; to be connected, 5. to realize; to complete; to accomplish, 6. to
display; to manifest, 7. to tell; to inform; to say, 8. illustrious;
influential; prestigious, 9. everlasting; constant; unchanging, 10.
generous; magnanimous, 11. commonly; everywhere, 12. arbitrary; freely come
and go

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:到>

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

APPRAISAL #9: It offends the ear but sets the toe on track. (到耳順止)
The matter will go right. (事貞)
FATHOMING #9: Offended ears, compliant toes (到耳順止)
MEANS: Contrary talk makes for obedient conduct. (逆聞順行也)

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

ěrshùn (耳順): 1. an obedient *EAR*, 2. pleasing to the ear

zhǐ (止): 1. to stop; to halt, 2. until; to end, 3. Kangxi radical 77, 4.
only, 5. to prohibit; to prevent; to refrain; to suppress, 6. to remain in
one place; to stay, 7. to rest; to settle, 8. deportment; bearing;
demeanor; manner, 9. a particle at the end of a phrase, 10. foot

shì (事): 1. matter; thing; item, 2. to serve, 3. a government post, 4.
duty; post; work, 5. occupation, 6. cause; undertaking; enterprise;
achievement, 7. an accident, 8. to attend, 9. an allusion, 10. a condition;
a state; a situation, 11. to engage in, 12. to enslave, 13. to pursue, 14.
to administer, 15. to appoint, 16. a piece

zhēn (貞): 1. virtuous; chaste; pure, 2. loyal, 3. divination, 4. chastity,
5. to divine, 6. auspicious, 7. upright, 8. lower part of the trigrams in
the Yijing, 9. four

We want to explore whether achieving this goal as the #451 - PRAXIS OF
RATIONALITY and its dynamic problem resolution pairing, actually involves
the two concepts that have been central to Husserl’s internalist
interpretation of intentionality: the concept of a noema (plural noemata)
and the concept of epoche (i.e., bracketing) or phenomenological reduction.
By the word ‘noema,’ Husserl refers to the internal structure of mental
acts. The phenomenological reduction is meant to help get at the essence of
mental acts by suspending all naive presuppositions about the difference
between real and fictitious entities (on these complex phenomenological
concepts, see the papers by Føllesdal and others conveniently gathered in
Dreyfus (1982). For further discussion, see Bell (1990) and Dummett (1993).

#169 as [#50, #70, #8, #40, #1] /
#470 = #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY + #19 - FOLLOWING (TS'UNG) as [#50,
#70, #8, #40, #1, #300, #1] = nóēma (G3540): {UMBRA: #169 % #41 = #5} 1) a
mental perception, thought; 2) an evil purpose; 3) that which thinks, the
mind, thoughts or purposes

APPRAISAL #3: Men do not attack him. (人不攻之)
They are drawn to follow. (自然證)
FATHOMING #3: That men do not attack him (人不攻之)
MEANS: This, in itself, is proof of Virtue's power. (自然證也)

rén (人): 1. person; people; a human being, 2. Kangxi radical 9, 3. a kind
of person, 4. everybody, 5. adult, 6. somebody; others, 7. an upright
person

bù (不): 1. not; no, 2. expresses that a certain condition cannot be
achieved, 3. as a correlative, 4. no (answering a question), 5. forms a
negative adjective from a noun, 6. at the end of a sentence to form a
question, 7. to form a yes or no question, 8. infix potential marker

gōng (攻): 1. to attack; to assault, 2. to discredit; to impugn; to
criticize, 3. to remedy; to cure, 4. to work at; to handle, 5. workmanship;
expertise, 6. exaction by the state, 7. sturdy; strong, 8. to govern; to
administer, 9. Gong

zhī (之): 1. him; her; them; that, 2. used between a modifier and a word to
form a word group, 3. to go, 4. this; that, 5. genitive marker, 6. it, 7.
in, 8. all, 9. and, 10. however, 11. if, 12. then, 13. to arrive; to go,
14. is, 15. to use, 16. Zhi

zìrán (自然): 1. nature, 2. natural, 3. of course; certainly; naturally

zhèng (證): 1. proof, 2. to prove; to demonstrate; to confirm; to give
evidence, 3. to advise against, 4. certificate, 5. an illness, 6. to accuse

In fact, commentators have been unable to achieve consensus on exactly what
a noema is. In a recent survey, David Woodruff Smith distinguished four
different schools of thought. On one view, to say that the noema is the
intentional object of an act of consciousness is to mean that it quite
literally is an object. Husserl's student Roman Ingarden, for example, held
that both ordinary objects, like chairs and trees, and intentional objects,
like a chair precisely as it appears to me, or even a fictional tree,
actually exist, but have different "modes" of existence.

An alternative view, developed primarily by Aron Gurwitsch, emphasizes the
noema of perceptual experience. Most ordinary objects can be perceived in
different ways and from different perspectives (consider looking at a tree
from several different positions). For Gurwitsch, what is perceived in each
such act is a noema, and the object itself—the tree, say—is to be
understood as the collection or system of noemata associated with it. This
view has similarities with phenomenalism.

Robert Sokolowski, alternatively, holds that a noema is just the actual
object of perception or judgment itself, considered phenomenologically. In
other words, the noema of the judgment that "this chair is uncomfortable"
is neither an entity (the chair considered as uncomfortable) which exists
in addition to the chair itself (but with a different mode of
existence)—the Ingarden view; nor is the noema of such a judgment
identified with a particular tactile perception of the chair—which along
with other perceptions constitutes the chair as such—the Gurwitsch view.
For Sokolowski, the noema is not a separate entity at all, but the chair
itself as in this instance perceived or judged. This seems consistent with
Husserl's emphasis on the noema as the "perceived as such…remembered as
such...judged as such..."

Analytic philosopher Dagfinn Føllesdal, in an influential 1969 paper,
proposed a Fregean interpretation of the noema, which has been developed
extensively by Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith. This school of
thought agrees that the noema is not a separate entity, but rather than
identifying it with the actual object of the act (of perceiving, judging,
etc.), phenomenologically understood, this view suggests that it is a
mediating component of the act itself. It is what gives the act the sense
it has. Indeed, Føllesdal and his followers suggest that the noema is a
generalized version of Gottlob Frege's account of linguistic meaning, and
in particular of his concept of sense (Sinn). Just as Frege held that a
linguistic expression picks out its reference by means of its sense, so
Husserl believed that conscious acts generally—not merely acts of meaning
but also acts of perception, judgment, etc.—are intentionally directed
toward objects by means of their noemata. On this view, the noema is not an
object, but an abstract component of certain types of acts.

Sokolowski has continued to reject this approach, arguing that "(t)o equate
sense and noema would be to equate propositional and phenomenological
reflection. It would take philosophy simply as the critical reflection on
our meanings or senses; it would equate philosophy with linguistic
analysis." Robert C. Solomon attempted to reconcile the perception-based
interpretation of the Gurwitsch school with the Fregean interpretation of
noema as sense, suggesting that while "(i)t has now become virtually
axiomatic among phenomenologists that the Sinne [senses] of experience
stand independent of the Bedeutungen [meanings] of linguistic expressions.
It has become all but axiomatic among analytic philosophers that there is
no meaning apart from language. It is the concept of the noema that
provides the link between them. The noema embodies both the changing phases
of experience and the organizing sense of our experience. But these two
'components' are not separable, for all experience requires meaning, not as
an after-the-fact luxury in reflective judgements but in order for it to be
experience of anything." <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noema>

-- (DRAFT 3) INFORMAL RESEARCH NOTES ON A PLAUSIBLE NOEMA SCENARIO [#230
- WICKED, #232 - KNIFE / WEAPON, #249 - SATOR (#38), #228 - ONTIC LIMIT
/ WITNESSING TRAVESTY AS REPROACH, #237 - DEME LIMIT / USE OF FORCE]
RELATED TO RAMPAGE KILLING EVENTS

(c) 2024 Dolf Leendert Boek, Published: 20 April 2024

In our informal research as self education, the meta-descriptive
aggregation of concepts of mind most likely has some relevance to the
philosophical concept of intentionality. But what we have recognised
from our memeBrain prototypes, is that the #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY
and its dynamic problem resolution pairing only occurs by being couched
with a preamble for which we have a desire to examine if the resolution
idea has recurrence as then a criteria for its attainment as pairing
action being a function of mind.

For want of a better term, we might consider this dá dào (達到): to reach;
to achieve; to attain

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:達>

dá (達): 1. to attain; to reach, 2. Da, 3. intelligent proficient, 4. to
be open; to be connected, 5. to realize; to complete; to accomplish, 6.
to display; to manifest, 7. to tell; to inform; to say, 8. illustrious;
influential; prestigious, 9. everlasting; constant; unchanging, 10.
generous; magnanimous, 11. commonly; everywhere, 12. arbitrary; freely
come and go

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:到>

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

APPRAISAL #9: It offends the ear but sets the toe on track. (到耳順止)
The matter will go right. (事貞)
FATHOMING #9: Offended ears, compliant toes (到耳順止)
MEANS: Contrary talk makes for obedient conduct. (逆聞順行也)

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

ěrshùn (耳順): 1. an obedient *EAR*, 2. pleasing to the ear

zhǐ (止): 1. to stop; to halt, 2. until; to end, 3. Kangxi radical 77, 4.
only, 5. to prohibit; to prevent; to refrain; to suppress, 6. to remain
in one place; to stay, 7. to rest; to settle, 8. deportment; bearing;
demeanor; manner, 9. a particle at the end of a phrase, 10. foot

shì (事): 1. matter; thing; item, 2. to serve, 3. a government post, 4.
duty; post; work, 5. occupation, 6. cause; undertaking; enterprise;
achievement, 7. an accident, 8. to attend, 9. an allusion, 10. a
condition; a state; a situation, 11. to engage in, 12. to enslave, 13.
to pursue, 14. to administer, 15. to appoint, 16. a piece

zhēn (貞): 1. virtuous; chaste; pure, 2. loyal, 3. divination, 4.
chastity, 5. to divine, 6. auspicious, 7. upright, 8. lower part of the
trigrams in the Yijing, 9. four

We want to explore whether achieving this goal as the #451 - PRAXIS OF
RATIONALITY and its dynamic problem resolution pairing, actually
involves the two concepts that have been central to Husserl’s
internalist interpretation of intentionality: the concept of a noema
(plural noemata) and the concept of epoche (i.e., bracketing) or
phenomenological reduction. By the word ‘noema,’ Husserl refers to the
internal structure of mental acts. The phenomenological reduction is
meant to help get at the essence of mental acts by suspending all naive
presuppositions about the difference between real and fictitious
entities (on these complex phenomenological concepts, see the papers by
Føllesdal and others conveniently gathered in Dreyfus (1982). For
further discussion, see Bell (1990) and Dummett (1993).

#169 as [#50, #70, #8, #40, #1] /
#470 = #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY + #19 - FOLLOWING (TS'UNG) as [#50,
#70, #8, #40, #1, #300, #1] = nóēma (G3540): {UMBRA: #169 % #41 = #5} 1)
a mental perception, thought; 2) an evil purpose; 3) that which thinks,
the mind, thoughts or purposes

APPRAISAL #3: Men do not attack him. (人不攻之)
They are drawn to follow. (自然證)
FATHOMING #3: That men do not attack him (人不攻之)
MEANS: This, in itself, is proof of Virtue's power. (自然證也)

rén (人): 1. person; people; a human being, 2. Kangxi radical 9, 3. a
kind of person, 4. everybody, 5. adult, 6. somebody; others, 7. an
upright person

bù (不): 1. not; no, 2. expresses that a certain condition cannot be
achieved, 3. as a correlative, 4. no (answering a question), 5. forms a
negative adjective from a noun, 6. at the end of a sentence to form a
question, 7. to form a yes or no question, 8. infix potential marker

gōng (攻): 1. to attack; to assault, 2. to discredit; to impugn; to
criticize, 3. to remedy; to cure, 4. to work at; to handle, 5.
workmanship; expertise, 6. exaction by the state, 7. sturdy; strong, 8.
to govern; to administer, 9. Gong

zhī (之): 1. him; her; them; that, 2. used between a modifier and a word
to form a word group, 3. to go, 4. this; that, 5. genitive marker, 6.
it, 7. in, 8. all, 9. and, 10. however, 11. if, 12. then, 13. to arrive;
to go, 14. is, 15. to use, 16. Zhi

zìrán (自然): 1. nature, 2. natural, 3. of course; certainly; naturally

zhèng (證): 1. proof, 2. to prove; to demonstrate; to confirm; to give
evidence, 3. to advise against, 4. certificate, 5. an illness, 6. to accuse

In fact, commentators have been unable to achieve consensus on exactly
what a noema is. In a recent survey, David Woodruff Smith distinguished
four different schools of thought. On one view, to say that the noema is
the intentional object of an act of consciousness is to mean that it
quite literally is an object. Husserl's student Roman Ingarden, for
example, held that both ordinary objects, like chairs and trees, and
intentional objects, like a chair precisely as it appears to me, or even
a fictional tree, actually exist, but have different "modes" of existence.

An alternative view, developed primarily by Aron Gurwitsch, emphasizes
the noema of perceptual experience. Most ordinary objects can be
perceived in different ways and from different perspectives (consider
looking at a tree from several different positions). For Gurwitsch, what
is perceived in each such act is a noema, and the object itself—the
tree, say—is to be understood as the collection or system of noemata
associated with it. This view has similarities with phenomenalism.

Robert Sokolowski, alternatively, holds that a noema is just the actual
object of perception or judgment itself, considered phenomenologically.
In other words, the noema of the judgment that "this chair is
uncomfortable" is neither an entity (the chair considered as
uncomfortable) which exists in addition to the chair itself (but with a
different mode of existence)—the Ingarden view; nor is the noema of such
a judgment identified with a particular tactile perception of the
chair—which along with other perceptions constitutes the chair as
such—the Gurwitsch view. For Sokolowski, the noema is not a separate
entity at all, but the chair itself as in this instance perceived or
judged. This seems consistent with Husserl's emphasis on the noema as
the "perceived as such…remembered as such...judged as such..."

Analytic philosopher Dagfinn Føllesdal, in an influential 1969 paper,
proposed a Fregean interpretation of the noema, which has been developed
extensively by Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith. This school of
thought agrees that the noema is not a separate entity, but rather than
identifying it with the actual object of the act (of perceiving,
judging, etc.), phenomenologically understood, this view suggests that
it is a mediating component of the act itself. It is what gives the act
the sense it has. Indeed, Føllesdal and his followers suggest that the
noema is a generalized version of Gottlob Frege's account of linguistic
meaning, and in particular of his concept of sense (Sinn). Just as Frege
held that a linguistic expression picks out its reference by means of
its sense, so Husserl believed that conscious acts generally—not merely
acts of meaning but also acts of perception, judgment, etc.—are
intentionally directed toward objects by means of their noemata. On this
view, the noema is not an object, but an abstract component of certain
types of acts.

Sokolowski has continued to reject this approach, arguing that "(t)o
equate sense and noema would be to equate propositional and
phenomenological reflection. It would take philosophy simply as the
critical reflection on our meanings or senses; it would equate
philosophy with linguistic analysis." Robert C. Solomon attempted to
reconcile the perception-based interpretation of the Gurwitsch school
with the Fregean interpretation of noema as sense, suggesting that while
"(i)t has now become virtually axiomatic among phenomenologists that the
Sinne [senses] of experience stand independent of the Bedeutungen
[meanings] of linguistic expressions. It has become all but axiomatic
among analytic philosophers that there is no meaning apart from
language. It is the concept of the noema that provides the link between
them. The noema embodies both the changing phases of experience and the
organizing sense of our experience. But these two 'components' are not
separable, for all experience requires meaning, not as an after-the-fact
luxury in reflective judgements but in order for it to be experience of
anything." <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noema>

-- (DRAFT 4) INFORMAL RESEARCH NOTES ON A PLAUSIBLE NOEMA SCENARIO [#230
- WICKED, #232 - KNIFE / WEAPON, #249 - SATOR (#38), #228 - ONTIC LIMIT
/ WITNESSING TRAVESTY AS REPROACH, #237 - DEME LIMIT / USE OF FORCE]
RELATED TO RAMPAGE KILLING EVENTS

(c) 2024 Dolf Leendert Boek, Published: 20 April 2024

In our informal research as self education, the meta-descriptive
aggregation of concepts of mind most likely has some relevance to the
philosophical concept of intentionality. But what we have recognised
from our memeBrain prototypes, is that the #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY
and its dynamic problem resolution pairing only occurs by being couched
with a preamble for which we have a desire to examine if the resolution
idea has recurrence as then a criteria for its attainment as pairing
action being a function of mind.

For want of a better term, we might consider this dá dào (達到): to reach;
to achieve; to attain

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:達>

dá (達): 1. to attain; to reach, 2. Da, 3. intelligent proficient, 4. to
be open; to be connected, 5. to realize; to complete; to accomplish, 6.
to display; to manifest, 7. to tell; to inform; to say, 8. illustrious;
influential; prestigious, 9. everlasting; constant; unchanging, 10.
generous; magnanimous, 11. commonly; everywhere, 12. arbitrary; freely
come and go

<http://www.grapple369.com/Savvy/?run:Mystery&glyph:到>

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

APPRAISAL #9: It offends the ear but sets the toe on track. (到耳順止)
The matter will go right. (事貞)
FATHOMING #9: Offended ears, compliant toes (到耳順止)
MEANS: Contrary talk makes for obedient conduct. (逆聞順行也)

dào (到): 1. to arrive, 2. arrive; receive, 3. to go, 4. careful, 5. Dao

ěrshùn (耳順): 1. an obedient *EAR*, 2. pleasing to the ear

zhǐ (止): 1. to stop; to halt, 2. until; to end, 3. Kangxi radical 77, 4.
only, 5. to prohibit; to prevent; to refrain; to suppress, 6. to remain
in one place; to stay, 7. to rest; to settle, 8. deportment; bearing;
demeanor; manner, 9. a particle at the end of a phrase, 10. foot

shì (事): 1. matter; thing; item, 2. to serve, 3. a government post, 4.
duty; post; work, 5. occupation, 6. cause; undertaking; enterprise;
achievement, 7. an accident, 8. to attend, 9. an allusion, 10. a
condition; a state; a situation, 11. to engage in, 12. to enslave, 13.
to pursue, 14. to administer, 15. to appoint, 16. a piece

zhēn (貞): 1. virtuous; chaste; pure, 2. loyal, 3. divination, 4.
chastity, 5. to divine, 6. auspicious, 7. upright, 8. lower part of the
trigrams in the Yijing, 9. four

We want to explore whether achieving this goal as the #451 - PRAXIS OF
RATIONALITY and its dynamic problem resolution pairing, actually
involves the two concepts that have been central to Husserl’s
internalist interpretation of intentionality: the concept of a noema
(plural noemata) and the concept of epoche (i.e., bracketing) or
phenomenological reduction. By the word ‘noema,’ Husserl refers to the
internal structure of mental acts. The phenomenological reduction is
meant to help get at the essence of mental acts by suspending all naive
presuppositions about the difference between real and fictitious
entities (on these complex phenomenological concepts, see the papers by
Føllesdal and others conveniently gathered in Dreyfus (1982). For
further discussion, see Bell (1990) and Dummett (1993).

#169 as [#50, #70, #8, #40, #1] /
#470 = #451 - PRAXIS OF RATIONALITY + #19 - FOLLOWING (TS'UNG) as [#50,
#70, #8, #40, #1, #300, #1] = nóēma (G3540): {UMBRA: #169 % #41 = #5} 1)
a mental perception, thought; 2) an evil purpose; 3) that which thinks,
the mind, thoughts or purposes

APPRAISAL #3: Men do not attack him. (人不攻之)
They are drawn to follow. (自然證)
FATHOMING #3: That men do not attack him (人不攻之)
MEANS: This, in itself, is proof of Virtue's power. (自然證也)

rén (人): 1. person; people; a human being, 2. Kangxi radical 9, 3. a
kind of person, 4. everybody, 5. adult, 6. somebody; others, 7. an
upright person

bù (不): 1. not; no, 2. expresses that a certain condition cannot be
achieved, 3. as a correlative, 4. no (answering a question), 5. forms a
negative adjective from a noun, 6. at the end of a sentence to form a
question, 7. to form a yes or no question, 8. infix potential marker

gōng (攻): 1. to attack; to assault, 2. to discredit; to impugn; to
criticize, 3. to remedy; to cure, 4. to work at; to handle, 5.
workmanship; expertise, 6. exaction by the state, 7. sturdy; strong, 8.
to govern; to administer, 9. Gong

zhī (之): 1. him; her; them; that, 2. used between a modifier and a word
to form a word group, 3. to go, 4. this; that, 5. genitive marker, 6.
it, 7. in, 8. all, 9. and, 10. however, 11. if, 12. then, 13. to arrive;
to go, 14. is, 15. to use, 16. Zhi

zìrán (自然): 1. nature, 2. natural, 3. of course; certainly; naturally

zhèng (證): 1. proof, 2. to prove; to demonstrate; to confirm; to give
evidence, 3. to advise against, 4. certificate, 5. an illness, 6. to accuse

In fact, commentators have been unable to achieve consensus on exactly
what a noema is. In a recent survey, David Woodruff Smith distinguished
four different schools of thought. On one view, to say that the noema is
the intentional object of an act of consciousness is to mean that it
quite literally is an object. Husserl's student Roman Ingarden, for
example, held that both ordinary objects, like chairs and trees, and
intentional objects, like a chair precisely as it appears to me, or even
a fictional tree, actually exist, but have different "modes" of existence.

An alternative view, developed primarily by Aron Gurwitsch, emphasizes
the noema of perceptual experience. Most ordinary objects can be
perceived in different ways and from different perspectives (consider
looking at a tree from several different positions). For Gurwitsch, what
is perceived in each such act is a noema, and the object itself—the
tree, say—is to be understood as the collection or system of noemata
associated with it. This view has similarities with phenomenalism.

Robert Sokolowski, alternatively, holds that a noema is just the actual
object of perception or judgment itself, considered phenomenologically.
In other words, the noema of the judgment that "this chair is
uncomfortable" is neither an entity (the chair considered as
uncomfortable) which exists in addition to the chair itself (but with a
different mode of existence)—the Ingarden view; nor is the noema of such
a judgment identified with a particular tactile perception of the
chair—which along with other perceptions constitutes the chair as
such—the Gurwitsch view. For Sokolowski, the noema is not a separate
entity at all, but the chair itself as in this instance perceived or
judged. This seems consistent with Husserl's emphasis on the noema as
the "perceived as such…remembered as such...judged as such..."

Analytic philosopher Dagfinn Føllesdal, in an influential 1969 paper,
proposed a Fregean interpretation of the noema, which has been developed
extensively by Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith. This school of
thought agrees that the noema is not a separate entity, but rather than
identifying it with the actual object of the act (of perceiving,
judging, etc.), phenomenologically understood, this view suggests that
it is a mediating component of the act itself. It is what gives the act
the sense it has. Indeed, Føllesdal and his followers suggest that the
noema is a generalized version of Gottlob Frege's account of linguistic
meaning, and in particular of his concept of sense (Sinn). Just as Frege
held that a linguistic expression picks out its reference by means of
its sense, so Husserl believed that conscious acts generally—not merely
acts of meaning but also acts of perception, judgment, etc.—are
intentionally directed toward objects by means of their noemata. On this
view, the noema is not an object, but an abstract component of certain
types of acts.

Sokolowski has continued to reject this approach, arguing that "(t)o
equate sense and noema would be to equate propositional and
phenomenological reflection. It would take philosophy simply as the
critical reflection on our meanings or senses; it would equate
philosophy with linguistic analysis." Robert C. Solomon attempted to
reconcile the perception-based interpretation of the Gurwitsch school
with the Fregean interpretation of noema as sense, suggesting that while
"(i)t has now become virtually axiomatic among phenomenologists that the
Sinne [senses] of experience stand independent of the Bedeutungen
[meanings] of linguistic expressions. It has become all but axiomatic
among analytic philosophers that there is no meaning apart from
language. It is the concept of the noema that provides the link between
them. The noema embodies both the changing phases of experience and the
organizing sense of our experience. But these two 'components' are not
separable, for all experience requires meaning, not as an after-the-fact
luxury in reflective judgements but in order for it to be experience of
anything." <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noema>