@firefly@neon.nightbulb.net

Protonmail reminds me of Operation Rubicon.

Propagandists and useful idiots routinely pump Proton Mail as a champion of privacy. They will post links to articles in which some agency or foreign government has requested Proton Mail to hand over user data. Then the article will position 'Swiss privacy laws' as saving the day. This smells of mockingbird media agitprop meant to generate interest in Protonmail. If enough such articles are circulated, the gullible will believe they are protected by 'Swiss privacy' then flock to Protonmail as their 'privacy savior'.

Everything you need to know about so-called 'Swiss Privacy' we learned decades ago from Operation Thesaurus, AKA, Operation Rubicon. We learned that CIA operations and black budget banking are actually headquartered in the Swiss underground.

Operation Rubicon
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rubicon

Crypto AG
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG

If you trust any third-party server to protect your privacy, you're a rube. If you trust Proton Mail to protect your privacy, you're a rube getting 'crossed' by the Swiss Rubi-con. Either you own your keys and your data on your computer or else you have no privacy. Someone else's promise that your data will be 'encrypted' so they can't decipher it is a hollow pledge. If you send any form of plaintext to a remote server, no matter how much they claim to encrypt it, you have zero assurance of data privacy. If you use an email server, even if you use end-to-end encryption, you have zero metadata privacy. Anyone can see WHO you are talking to even if they can't see the talk itself. Criminals and spooks are generally more interested in _who_ you talk to over _what_ you say. The _who_ is the most important piece of knowledge for their operations.

When using email for encrypted messages is always better for both parties to use their own email servers. Even better than that is to use a encrypted messenger through a Tor hidden service. The encrypted messenger must NOT rely on the Tor keys for the security of the encryption, but must first encrypt it using secret keys _before_ sending the data over the Tor network. Even with Tor, metadata unmasking is possible through monitoring and traffic correlation attacks. If you are a whistleblower or an at-risk person it is still far safer to send coded messages by other channels.

If you rely on Protonmail and similar services for high-risk communications you are taking a dangerous risk.

Watch the phan boiz rage outlet!

#Cryptography #Cryptology #Encryption #Crypto #Protonmail #CryptoAG #Switzerland #CIA

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www.sybershock.com | sci.crypt | alt.sources.crypto | alt.lite.bulb

On Mon 22 Apr 2024 3:05 pm, SugarBug wrote:
> If you trust any third-party server to protect your privacy, you're a rube.
If you trust electronic comms you're a rube. Security is offline.

On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 17:07:19 +0000, Anonymous wrote:

> Security is offline.

And knowing whom you're dealing with.

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Cri-Cri

Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>On Mon 22 Apr 2024 3:05 pm, SugarBug wrote:

>> If you trust any third-party server to protect your privacy, you're a rube.
> If you trust electronic comms you're a rube. Security is offline.

I doubt it. Offline, which means non-virtual interaction by
exchanging physical media, inevitably leaves much more traces than
electronic communication, to be exact asynchronous anonymous onion
routing as done with a combination of Tor & Mixmaster / YAMN. Just
think of fingerprints or DNA contamination of communication media, the
kind of paper, ink or printer and toner you use, the postoffice that
took delivery of your letter and so on. And I've no idea how to
create an anonymous real world reply channel as offered by our
nymservers. No, provided that your device isn't compromised anonymous
remailing is the best we have, state of the art in this field.

On a sunny day (Mon, 22 Apr 2024 22:12:13 +0100) it happened Yamn Remailer
<noreply@mixmin.net> wrote in <20240422.221213.b8e85811@mixmin.net>:

>Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>On Mon 22 Apr 2024 3:05 pm, SugarBug wrote:
>
>>> If you trust any third-party server to protect your privacy, you're a rube.
>> If you trust electronic comms you're a rube. Security is offline.
>
>I doubt it. Offline, which means non-virtual interaction by
>exchanging physical media, inevitably leaves much more traces than
>electronic communication, to be exact asynchronous anonymous onion
>routing as done with a combination of Tor & Mixmaster / YAMN. Just
>think of fingerprints or DNA contamination of communication media, the
>kind of paper, ink or printer and toner you use, the postoffice that
>took delivery of your letter and so on. And I've no idea how to
>create an anonymous real world reply channel as offered by our
>nymservers. No, provided that your device isn't compromised anonymous
>remailing is the best we have, state of the art in this field.

With 2 TB micro SD cards homing pigeons are good for lots of data in a short time.
Of course adversaries can target the pigeon holders,
The next step is to add the info to the DNA of animals...
or just to the regular mail or objects as contamination..
;-)

On 22 Apr 2024, Jan Panteltje <alien@comet.invalid> posted some
news:v07lc8$cl5k$1@solani.org:

> On a sunny day (Mon, 22 Apr 2024 22:12:13 +0100) it happened Yamn
> Remailer
><noreply@mixmin.net> wrote in <20240422.221213.b8e85811@mixmin.net>:
>
>>Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>>On Mon 22 Apr 2024 3:05 pm, SugarBug wrote:
>>
>>>> If you trust any third-party server to protect your privacy, you're
>>>> a rube.
>>> If you trust electronic comms you're a rube. Security is offline.
>>
>>I doubt it. Offline, which means non-virtual interaction by
>>exchanging physical media, inevitably leaves much more traces than
>>electronic communication, to be exact asynchronous anonymous onion
>>routing as done with a combination of Tor & Mixmaster / YAMN. Just
>>think of fingerprints or DNA contamination of communication media, the
>>kind of paper, ink or printer and toner you use, the postoffice that
>>took delivery of your letter and so on. And I've no idea how to
>>create an anonymous real world reply channel as offered by our
>>nymservers. No, provided that your device isn't compromised anonymous
>>remailing is the best we have, state of the art in this field.
>
> With 2 TB micro SD cards homing pigeons are good for lots of data in a
> short time. Of course adversaries can target the pigeon holders,
> The next step is to add the info to the DNA of animals...
> or just to the regular mail or objects as contamination..
> ;-)

That actually works.

An SD card fits nicely behind a stamp on a postcard too.

You're on to something with the DNA.

On Tue, 23 Apr 2024 06:44:23 GMT, Jan Panteltje wrote:

> With 2 TB micro SD cards homing pigeons are good for lots of data in a
> short time.

Slower: Growing trees in the form of a QR code? ;)

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Cri-Cri